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Climate change deniers, anti-vaxxers and anti-
GM campaigners: groups of  people characterised 
by sometimes vehement denial of  the conclu-
sions of  scientific research. This “rejection of  
science” poses a problem for modern society, the 
spread of  doubt and misinformation from these 
groups can have negative – and potentially tragic 
– consequences (Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 
2016).1 The natural response of  many scientists 
confronted with counter-scientific beliefs is to 
provide ever more evidence to support the 
scientific position (Simis et al., 2016). However, 
rejection of  science is not simply a symptom of  
lack of  knowledge. Some people refuse to shift 
their beliefs in the face of  evidence (Kraft et al., 
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2015). This behaviour has spurred social scien-
tists to examine how individuals’ social beliefs 
and values drive their understanding of  scientific 
issues (for reviews see Hornsey & Fielding, 2017; 
Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016; Rutjens et al., 
2018). In this regard, a general distrust of, or lack 
of  faith in, science as an enterprise explains some 
variation in people’s beliefs about scientific issues; 
however, there are much broader sets of  beliefs 
and values which also have a bearing on rejection 
of  science (Hartman et al., 2017).
Ideologies – in their broadest sense, coherent 
and stable sets of  beliefs and values (Knight, 
2006) – play a role in how people think about sci-
ence. Both political ideology and religiosity are 
predictors of  rejection of  science, although the 
involvement of  these belief  systems largely 
depends on the issue under consideration 
(Rutjens et al., 2017). For example, political con-
servatism is consistently linked with climate 
change denial but rarely with opposition to the 
scientific consensus on GM food safety 
(Drummond & Fischhoff, 2017; Rutjens et al., 
2017). Religiosity is a well-established predictor 
of  denial of  the theory of  evolution, but explains 
little variance in peoples’ beliefs about climate 
change once political ideology is taken into 
account (Ecklund et al., 2017).
While politics and religion are noted correlates 
of  rejection of  science on some issues, recent 
research has uncovered further predictors which 
can be thought of  as ideological in nature. 
“Conspiracy mentality” has been described as a 
“stable ideological belief  system” (Imhoff  & 
Bruder, 2014, p. 26) based around the perception 
that secret, powerful groups are behind impor-
tant social, political or economic events. People 
who exhibit this propensity to endorse conspir-
acy theories are more likely to reject scientific 
findings across a number of  issues, including: cli-
mate change, vaccines, evolution, GM food, HIV, 
and the link between cancer and smoking 
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013; 
Lobato & Zimmerman, 2019). People with an 
ideological commitment to free market principles 
are also more likely to disagree with mainstream 
science on climate change and medical issues 
(Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 2013; 
Lewandowsky, Oberauer, & Gignac, 2013).
Psychological research has sought to under-
stand the deeper individual differences, such as 
personality traits, values and worldviews, upon 
which different ideological positions are based. 
One of  the most promising approaches is found 
in Duckitt and Sibley’s Dual Process Model 
(DPM), which positions the “ideological atti-
tudes” right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) and 
social dominance orientation (SDO) as drivers of  
a range of  socio-political attitudes, including con-
servatism, racism and prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 
2009). Right-wing authoritarianism comprises 
three covarying attitudinal clusters: authoritarian 
submission, authoritarian aggression, and con-
ventionalism (Altemeyer, 2006, p. 35). Social 
dominance orientation is defined by Sidanius and 
Pratto as “the degree to which individuals desire 
and support group-based hierarchy and the dom-
ination of  ‘inferior’ groups by ‘superior’ groups” 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, p. 48). In the context of  
the Dual Process Model, Duckitt and Sibley 
(2016) describe these ideological attitudes as “two 
broad motivationally (or value) based social atti-
tude or ideological dimensions” (p. 190).
Recent research has explored the role of  RWA 
and SDO in climate change denial, demonstrating 
that these stable ideological attitudes robustly pre-
dict rejection of  the mainstream scientific consen-
sus that human-caused climate change is occurring 
(Stanley & Wilson, 2019). At the same time, no 
research has examined the role of  these ideologi-
cal attitudes in beliefs about other areas of  pub-
licly contested science, such as vaccination. 
However, there is good reason to believe that 
ideological attitudes would predict rejection of  
science across a range of  issues. Notably, RWA 
and SDO predict all the aforementioned ideologi-
cal correlates of  rejection of  science: political 
conservatism (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; Wilson & 
Sibley, 2013), free-market ideology (Buckland, 
2014; Jost et al., 2003), conspiracy mentality 
(Grzesiak-Feldman & Irzycka, 2009; Wilson & 
Rose, 2014), and religiosity (RWA only; Altemeyer, 
1998; Wilson & Sibley, 2013). We would therefore 
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expect the ideological attitudes RWA and SDO to 
be associated beliefs about a range of  scientific 
issues, with effects mediated by different ideologi-
cal constructs depending on the specific issue in 
question. However, the extent to which conserva-
tive political ideology, free-market ideology, religi-
osity and conspiracy would mediate the effect of  
RWA and SDO on belief  in specific scientific 
findings, when considered in combination, is unclear. 
These ideological constructs are intercorrelated, 
but little research has examined their unique 
effects in multivariate models. For example, 
Rutjens et al.’s (2017), examination of  the ideo-
logical correlates of  rejection of  science (specifi-
cally climate change, vaccination and GM food) 
did not include conspiracy thinking, and 
Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer’s (2013) 
similar modelling excluded religiosity.
In terms of  explaining possible links between 
RWA, SDO and rejection of  science, the current 
study focuses on the four ideological constructs 
outlined above (political ideology, free-market 
endorsement, conspiracy mentality and religios-
ity). We acknowledge that there are further pos-
sible factors at play (e.g., moral foundations, 
Amin et al., 2017; or system justification, Feygina 
et al., 2010; Hennes et al., 2016) but have limited 
our focus here to conceptually distinct constructs 
which have been shown to predict rejection of  
specific scientific findings in multiple domains.
Further, no studies have specifically examined 
RWA and SDO as predictors of  attitudes to sci-
ence and scientists more generally. Here we offer 
a tentative argument that ideological attitudes 
would also predict negative perceptions of  scien-
tists. More socially dominant individuals may be 
cynical about science and scientists because they 
perceive scientists as challenging hierarchical 
social structures. A great deal of  scientific 
research takes place in universities and the public 
situate science in a university context (Bainbridge, 
2015). This is important, as Social Dominance 
Theory highlights universities as examples of  
hierarchy-attenuating social institutions, that is, 
they function to decrease inequalities (Sidanius 
et al., 1991; Sinclair et al., 1998). Douglas (2015) 
also speculates that hierarchy-valuing individuals 
are likely to be less trusting of  science as it is 
based on an “epistemic community that values 
recognizing that each scientist ‘stands on the 
shoulders of  giants’ (i.e., all the other scientists 
who came before) and for which community crit-
icism is part of  the assurance of  reliable knowl-
edge” (p. 298). Thus, we might expect those who 
reported greater endorsement of  SDO to be 
critical of  scientists as members of  hierarchy-
attenuating institutions. However, we must recog-
nise the possibility that a perception of  scientists 
(and universities) as elite and hierarchical could 
lead high-SDO individuals to form positive eval-
uations of  scientists.
Considering these two possibilities, we find 
there is some empirical support for SDO predict-
ing negative attitudes towards scientists – if  we 
consider constructs analogous to SDO. Within 
the “Cultural Cognition” framework, Kahan 
(2012a, 2012b) employs a measure of  a hierarchy-
endorsing cultural worldview: the Hierarchy–
Egalitarianism scale. This scale has some 
conceptual overlap with the SDO scales employed 
in Social Dominance Theory (Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999), including items such as “We have gone too 
far in pushing equal rights in this country” and 
“Our society would be better off  if  the distribu-
tion of  wealth was more equal” (reverse coded). 
Hartman et al. (2017) included the Hierarchy–
Egalitarianism scale in their validation of  the 
Credibility of  Science scale and report the two 
measures are moderately negatively correlated (r 
= –.45). That is, people who endorse a hierarchi-
cal structure of  society are less likely to perceive 
scientists as credible.
There are theoretical reasons to expect that 
RWA is also associated with negative attitudes 
towards scientists and science more broadly. 
Scientists, as a group, may be perceived as chal-
lenging established authorities and violating 
moral norms. Rutjens and Heine (2016) provide 
data that support this assumption. Respondents 
to an online survey perceived scientists (com-
pared to “regular people”), as less religious and as 
valuing knowledge, curiosity and exploration over 
“doing the right thing”, morality and “following 
the norms”. Reinforcing this, scientists were also 
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perceived as less likely to endorse the binding 
moral foundations outlined in Moral Foundation 
Theory (Graham et al., 2011): loyalty, authority 
and purity. Previous research has mapped moral 
foundations onto RWA, finding that authoritari-
ans place greater value on the binding founda-
tions (Federico et al., 2013). Thus, high RWAs 
may see scientists as moral deviants or following 
a “different moral compass”.
One can also frame the potential conflict 
between ideological attitudes and science in terms 
of  the norms of  science. For instance, sociologist 
Robert Merton identified four key sets of  values 
attached to the idealised pursuit of  science: com-
munism, universalism, disinterestedness, and 
organised scepticism (Merton, 1973; see also 
Rutjens et al., 2018). We can contrast these norms 
with values embraced by high RWA and SDO 
people. Communism, the free sharing of  ideas 
and information, and universalism, the openness 
of  science to all comers, conflict with the com-
petitive and hierarchical beliefs of  high SDOs. 
Disinterestedness, a lack of  ideological loyalty, 
and scepticism, a questioning of  tradition and 
established authority, conflict with the in-group 
loyalty and unquestioning obedience to authority 
of  high RWAs. Merton (1973) writes that conflict 
with the norms of  science likely manifests as a 
general opposition to science which “may exist 
quite apart from the introduction of  specific sci-
entific discoveries which appear to invalidate par-
ticular dogmas of  church, economy, or state. It is 
rather a diffuse, frequently vague, apprehension 
that scepticism threatens the current distribution 
of  power” (p. 278). To summarise, in the case of  
those who score relatively higher on RWA and 
SDO, a perceived lack of  shared values with sci-
entists and a perception that scientists threaten 
hierarchies and challenge authorities could under-
lie a distrust of  science, which in turn leads to 
rejection of  science (Fiske & Dupree, 2014; 
Hartman et al., 2017).
In terms of  the scientific issues we draw upon 
as examples of  rejection of  science, we include in 
the current research the following claims – all 
supported by a scientific consensus: the reality of  
anthropogenic climate change (Cook et al., 2016), 
the safety of  genetically modified food (National 
Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, and 
Medicine, 2016b) and the safety and efficacy of  
vaccines (Omer & Yildirim, 2019). These three 
topics have been included in key studies investi-
gating the ideological correlates of  rejection of  
science (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & Oberauer, 
2013; Rutjens et al., 2017). In Studies 2 and 3 we 
expand on the scope of  this research and investi-
gate two additional issues, agreement that com-
munity water fluoridation for the protection of  
dental health is safe and effective (Royal Society 
of  New Zealand, 2014), and belief  that humans 
evolved from earlier species (Dobzhansky, 1973).
The purpose of  the following studies is two-
fold. First, we aim to establish if  the two key con-
structs of  the Dual Process Model, RWA and 
SDO, predict acceptance/rejection of  science 
across a range of  issues (Study 1). Second, we 
examine whether, and to what extent, several 
related ideological and science-specific constructs 
mediate these effects in US and New Zealand 
samples (Studies 2 and 3).
Study 1
Methods
Participants. Participants in the study were stu-
dents enrolled in an introductory psychology 
course at Victoria University of Wellington in 
2017. A total of 547 participants took part in the 
study (415 women, 128 men and four reporting 
non-binary or no gender). Ages ranged from 16 
to 64 years of age (M = 19.19, SD = 3.56).
Materials. The following measures were embed-
ded in a larger omnibus survey covering a wide 
range of  topics. Responses to all items were cap-
tured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). All 
scales demonstrated satisfactory reliability (see 
Table S1 in the online supplemental material).
Participants completed Altemeyer’s (1996) 
30-item RWA scale (example item: Obedience and 
respect for authority are the most important virtues chil-
dren should learn; α = .95) and the 16-item SDO7 
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scale (Ho et al., 2015) (example: We shouldn’t try to 
guarantee that every group has the same quality of  life; α 
= .90). Rejection of  science-dependent variables 
included Lewandowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer’s 
(2013) five-item scale capturing belief  that human 
activity is causing climate change (example: 
Human CO2 emissions cause climate change; α = .75), 
Dixons’ (2016) three-item GM food safety scale 
(example: GM food is safe to eat; α = .86). A single 
item measured acceptance of  vaccine safety: 
Vaccines are safe. Responses were coded such that 
higher values indicated greater agreement with 
the scientific consensus position.
Procedure. Participants completed the survey 
online on the SurveyMonkey platform in return 
for partial fulfilment of  a mandatory course 
research component. Participants provided 
informed consent and were fully debriefed at the 
end of  the survey. The study was approved by the 
Victoria University of  Wellington School of  Psy-
chology Human Ethics Committee (application 
number: 0000023961).
Results
Students generally endorsed the scientific con-
sensus position, with mean scores above the 
midpoint on the climate (M = 5.59, SD = 0.91), 
GM (M = 4.22, SD = 1.21) and vaccine (M = 
5.69, SD = 1.27) science scales. Mean scores on 
the RWA and SDO scales were below the mid-
point (MRWA = 2.64, SD = 0.89; MSDO = 2.81, 
SD = 0.89). Intercorrelations are reported in 
Table S1 in the online supplemental material. 
For each of  the three scientific issues, agree-
ment was regressed onto RWA, SDO, age and 
gender. All regressions were significant, Fs(4, 
538) > 16.90, ps <.001, and revealed both RWA 
and SDO to be negative predictors of  agree-
ment that: anthropogenic climate change is 
occurring (βRWA = –.36, p < .001; βSDO = –.24, 
p < .001), GM food is safe to eat (βRWA = –.20, 
p <.001; βSDO = –.12, p < .05), and vaccines are 
safe (βRWA = –.24, p <.001; βSDO = –.12, p < 
.05; see Table S2 in the online supplemental 
material). The results indicate that students who 
endorse authoritarian or socially dominant val-
ues are more likely to hold beliefs in opposition 
to established scientific consensus regarding cli-
mate change, GM food and vaccination.
Study 2
In Study 2 we sought to replicate Study 1 results 
in an online US sample and identify potential 
mediators of  the effects of  RWA and SDO on 
agreement with scientific claims. Specifically, we 
included several theorised ideological conse-
quents of  RWA and SDO known to predict 
rejection of  science on some debated issues: 
political ideology, religiosity, free-market ideol-
ogy and conspiracy mentality. Additionally, we 
assessed perceived credibility of  scientists and 
included a set of  true/false items as a brief  
measure of  science literacy. Here we also 
expanded the number of  publicly debated scien-
tific issues examined, adding brief  measures of  
belief  in evolution (i.e., agreement that humans 
evolved from earlier species), and water fluorida-
tion safety and efficacy. We also replaced the sin-
gle vaccination item with a multi-item measure 
of  vaccine safety and efficacy beliefs and used 
shorter measures of  authoritarianism (Duckitt 
et al., 2010) and SDO (Ho et al., 2015).
Methods
Participants. Participants were recruited via the 
Prolific Academic platform (prolific.ac), with 
participation limited to US-based individuals 
only. A total of 710 individuals completed the 
survey. Participants who failed either of two 
attention checks (e.g., “Please select ‘agree’ for 
this statement”; Gummer et al., 2018) embed-
ded in the survey were removed from the sam-
ple (47 participants).
There was a relatively even split of  gender in 
the remaining sample with 325 women (49.0%), 
316 men (47.6%) and 22 participants reporting 
no or non-binary gender (3.3%; excluded from 
analyses). Age was captured on a 12-point scale, 
with 25–29 years the median and modal response. 
Most participants identified as White (76.3%), 
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followed by Black/African American (10.4%), 
Asian (10.3%), Hispanic/Latino (3.8%) and other 
(3.7%).
Materials. In discussing the variables examined in 
this study we differentiate between the ideological 
attitudes RWA and SDO and other ideological 
constructs (religiosity, conservatism, free-market 
ideology and conspiracy mentality) which we will 
refer to as ideological mediators, given their role in 
the current study and their more theoretically 
proximal role as foundations for issue-based atti-
tudes. We refer to science literacy and perceived 
credibility of  scientists as science-specific mediators 
and the dependent variables capturing agreement 
with the scientific consensus are collectively 
referred to as rejection of  science variables, although 
higher scores indicate greater agreement with the 
consensus position (Lewandowsky, Gignac, & 
Oberauer, 2013; Rutjens et al., 2017). Unless oth-
erwise specified, all responses were recorded on 
seven-point Likert scale (strongly disagree to 
strongly agree). With one exception, noted below, 
all scales demonstrated satisfactory reliability (see 
Table S3 in the online supplemental material).
Ideological attitudes. Participants completed 
Duckitt et al.’s (2010) 18-item revised form of  
Altemeyer’s (1996) RWA scale (example item: 
Obedience and respect for authority are the most impor-
tant virtues children should learn) and the shortened 
eight-item SDO7 scale (Ho et al., 2015) (example: 
We shouldn’t try to guarantee that every group has the 
same quality of  life).
Ideological mediators. Political ideology was cal-
culated as the average score of  responses to three 
items asking participants to indicate their political 
position generally, and on social and economic 
issues. Responses were recorded on a seven-
point scale ranging from very liberal (1) to very 
conservative (7). Religiosity was measured using 
the brief  version of  the Santa Clara Strength of  
Religious Faith Questionnaire (Plante et al., 2002) 
(example: My faith impacts many of  my decisions). 
Free-market ideology was measured using Heath 
and Gifford’s (2006) five-item scale (example: The 
free-market system is likely to promote unsustainable con-
sumption – reverse coded).2 Conspiracy mentality 
was measured using Bruder et al.’s (2013) five-
item Conspiracy Mentality Questionnaire (exam-
ple: I think that there are secret organisations that greatly 
influence political decisions).
Science-specific mediators. Science literacy 
was captured using an adapted version of  the 
National Science Foundation’s science literacy 
scale, a widely used true/false test of  general sci-
ence knowledge (example: Electrons are smaller than 
atoms; Miller, 2004). Following the recommenda-
tions of  Roos (2014), we removed items relating 
to evolution, the Big Bang and continental drift 
from the original scale, as these tap a religious 
dimension. In addition to providing a true/false 
response for the remaining eight items, partici-
pants also reported how confident they were of  
each of  their answers on a four-point scale rang-
ing from very unsure to very sure. Answers and 
certainty were combined such that scores for 
each item ranged from 1 (incorrect and very sure) 
to 8 (correct and very sure). This approach is 
similar to that of  Nisbet et al. (2015) and others 
in creating a continuous rather than dichotomous 
response set for these items. A scale formed 
from the average of  these scores displayed only 
marginal reliability (α = .63), but was retained 
to allow comparison with other studies, given 
the widespread use of  these items as a meas-
ure of  scientific knowledge (Allum et al., 2008). 
Perceived credibility of  scientists was measured 
using Hartman et al.’s (2017) six-item Credibility 
of  Scientists Scale (COSS; example: People trust 
scientists a lot more than they should). Following the 
recommendation of  Hartman et al., scores on 
the COSS were reversed such that higher values 
indicated greater perceived credibility of  science 
and scientists.
Rejection of science. Participants’ beliefs about 
scientific issues were measured using five separate 
scales. Belief  in the existence of  human-caused 
climate change was measured using  Lewan-
dowsky, Gignac, and Oberauer’s (2013) five-item 
scale (example: Human CO2 emissions cause climate 
556 Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 24(4)
change). Dixon’s (2016) three-item scale measured 
agreement that GM food is safe to eat (GM food 
is safe to eat). Agreement that vaccines are safe and 
effective was measured with  Lewandowsky, Gig-
nac, and Oberauer’s (2013)  five-item scale (Vac-
cines are a safe and reliable way to avert the spread of  
preventable diseases). Acceptance of  the theory of  
evolution was measured with two items (Human 
beings, as we know them today, evolved from earlier spe-
cies; and Humans evolved from earlier primate ancestors 
over millions of  years; r = .93). As there were no 
established and well-validated scales for assess-
ing attitudes towards fluoridation, agreement that 
community water fluoridation is safe and effec-
tive was captured using a new scale with four 
items covering both the purported negative and 
positive health effects of  fluoride (Royal Society 
of  New Zealand, 2014), with an equal number of  
positive and reverse items (examples: Community 
water fluoridation is effective in reducing tooth decay; Add-
ing even small amounts of  fluoride to drinking water can 
have harmful effects on those who drink it). A principal 
components analysis (varimax rotation) indicated 
all items loaded (.84 or higher) onto a single fac-
tor explaining 81.54% of  variance.
Procedure. Participants who registered to under-
take the survey were directed to the Qualtrics sur-
vey platform (qualtrics.com) and provided 
informed consent before starting the survey and 
completing all measures. Participants read a 
debrief  at the end of  the survey and received 
US$1.60 compensation via the Academic Prolific 
platform. The study was approved by the Victoria 
University of  Wellington School of  Psychology 
Human Ethics Committee (application number: 
0000025633). Data were cleaned, and descriptive 
and inferential statistics calculated in SPSS v23. A 
small number of  missing values (0.16%) were 
imputed using the Expectation-Maximization 
procedure in SPSS.
Model specification. A structural equation model 
was constructed using the R package lavaan (Ros-
seel, 2012). Stable ideological attitudes RWA and 
SDO were considered exogenous variables pre-
dicting rejection of  science on the five separate 
issues. Political conservatism, religiosity, free-
market ideology, conspiracy mentality, science lit-
eracy and perceived credibility of  scientists were 
included in the model as potential mediators of  
these effects. That is, each latent rejection of  
science variable was regressed onto ideological 
attitudes as well as ideological and science-spe-
cific mediators. Ideological and science-specific 
mediators were also regressed onto ideological 
attitudes. We note that there may be theoreti-
cal justifications for including science-specific 
variables as a second set of  mediators between 
ideological mediators and rejection of  science as 
these could be assumed to be more psychologi-
cally proximal to beliefs about scientific issues 
(c.f. Rutjens et al., 2017). However, in pursuit of  
parsimony in the current model we include all 
mediators in parallel. Our primary focus here is 
to explain the association between RWA/SDO 
and rejection of  science. Items for the RWA, 
SDO and science literacy latent variables were 
randomly parcelled to create three observed 
indicators for each variable (Little et al., 2009). 
All mediator variables were correlated with each 
other. In the absence of  theoretical grounds 
for omission from the starting model, all paths 
were retained in the final model although only 
significant paths are reported here. Given the 
significant influence of  demographic controls 
(see Table 1), age and gender were included as 
covariates (effects are not reported here but can 
be found in Table S3 in the online supplemen-
tal material). We did not remove non-significant 
paths or make adjustments based on modifica-
tion indices.
Fit statistics robust to non-normality were 
computed using the MLM estimator in lavaan 
(employing Satorra-Bentler scaling). Bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for indirect effects were 
obtained using the ML estimator as the MLM 
estimator precludes bootstrapping.
Results
Descriptive statistics and correlations are 
reported in Table S3 in the online supplemental 
material.
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To examine the unique effects of  ideological 
attitudes, we first regressed each of  the five sci-
entific belief  variables onto RWA and SDO, 
with gender and age as covariates (as in Study 1). 
All regressions were significant, Fs(4, 636) > 
15.89, ps < .001. The results, shown in Table 1, 
reveal RWA is a consistent predictor of  rejec-
tion of  science across all five issues, while SDO 
predicts rejection of  climate change, vaccination 
and fluoridation.
To examine ideological mediators of  these 
effects we constructed a structural equation 
model using the R package lavaan. The resulting 
model displayed reasonable fit (χ2(1278) = 
3234.04, CFI = .912, RMSEA = .049 [0.047, 
0.051], SRMR = .063; computed using the 
Satorra–Bentler scaled chi-squared statistic), 
according to widely used criteria (Hu & Bentler, 
1999): RMSEA < .06 and SRMR < .08 (although 
the CFI was below the suggested .95 threshold). 
Significant associations between latent variables 
are shown in Figure 1.
Due to space we do not report the large num-
ber of  individual indirect effects here (see Table 
S5 in the online supplemental material). To sum-
marise, any two connecting significant paths (ide-
ological attitude → mediator → acceptance of  
science) represent a significant indirect effect (i.e., 
the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval did 
not include zero). For example, the total effect of  
RWA on GM food was mediated by religiosity (β 
= –.07, b = −.10, bootstrapped 95% CI [−0.19, 
−0.02]), conspiracy mentality (β = −.06, b = 
−.08, [−0.14, −0.03]), science literacy (β = −.10, 
b = –.14, [−0.23, −0.07]), and perceived 
Table 1. Demographic and ideological predictors of acceptance of science (US sample, Study 2).
Climate change GM food Vaccination Fluoridation Evolution
Age −.08** −.07* −.11**  .04 −.05
Gender (M = 1)  .05  .16***  .02 .14***  .06
RWA −.38*** −.36*** −.32*** −.22*** −.51***
SDO −.29*** −.01 −.12** −.10*  .04
Adjusted R2 .37*** .17*** .19*** .09*** .24***
Notes. Standardised regression coefficients. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
credibility of  scientists (β = −.10, b = −.13, 
[−0.23, −0.03]). Of  note was the effect of  SDO 
on evolution and GM food beliefs. While the 
total effect of  SDO on these variables was not 
significant (consistent with the results of  regres-
sion analyses, Table 1), examination of  indirect 
effects revealed significant opposing effects. We 
detected a positive effect of  SDO on evolution 
and GM food beliefs mediated via religiosity 
(βevolution = .05, b = .06, [0.02, 0.13]; βGM = .02, b 
= .03, [0.005, 0.07]) and a negative indirect effect 
via credibility of  scientists (βevolution = .04, b = .05, 
[−0.12, −0.01]; βGM = −.02, b = −.03, [−0.08, 
−0.005]). In the case of  evolution, free-market 
ideology also mediates a negative effect (β = 
−0.02, b = −0.03, [−0.07, −0.004]). There was a 
significant indirect effect of  SDO on fluoridation 
via credibility of  scientists (β = −.04, b = −.05, 
[−0.12, −0.01]), though this did not result in a 
significant total effect. Thus, SDO does have 
indirect and, at times, conflicting influences on 
GM food, fluoride and evolution beliefs. We also 
note that there was a significant direct effect of  
SDO on climate science acceptance in the model, 
indicating that the full effect of  SDO on the cli-
mate latent variable was partially mediated, i.e., 
the mediated indirect effect did not fully account 
for the total effect.
Notably, the only consistent mediator across 
all five outcome variables was perceived credibil-
ity of  scientists, which mediated significant, nega-
tive effects of  RWA and SDO on all outcome 
variables (Table 2).
The analysis shows that RWA is a significant, 
negative predictor of  agreement with scientific 
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consensus across domains, but the combination 
of  variables which mediate this effect changes 
depending on the scientific issue under 
consideration. Perceived credibility of  scientists, 
however, emerges as a consistent mediator in 
this context. While SDO only demonstrated a 
significant total effect on two scientific belief  
variables (climate change and vaccination) SDO 
also had a consistent negative indirect effect on 
all issues mediated via perceived credibility of  
scientists. We reiterate this key finding: both 
RWA and SDO predict lower perceived credibil-
ity of  scientists, which in turn predicts rejection 
of  science in all five domains examined.
Study 3
Methods
In Study 3, we broadly replicated these finding in 
a large, non-representative sample of  New 
Zealanders recruited through a major New 
Zealand newspaper.
Participants. Participants were recruited through a 
through a national newspaper (see Procedure sec-
tion below). Only participants who completed 
Figure 1. Mediators of the effects of RWA and SDO on acceptance of science in Study 2. Age and gender 
covariates and non-significant paths (p > .05) not shown (estimates for all parameters are reported in Table S4 
in the online supplemental material).
Notes. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.
Table 2. Indirect effects of ideological attitudes on 
scientific beliefs, mediated by perceived credibility of 
scientists (Study 2, US sample).
Predictor Outcome β b 95 CI
RWA Climate −0.17 −0.22 [−0.33, −0.13]
 GM food −0.10 −0.13 [−0.22, −0.04]
 Vaccination −0.25 −0.27 [−0.37, −0.18]
 Fluoridation −0.15 −0.22 [−0.35, −0.12]
 Evolution −0.16 −0.23 [−0.36, −0.13]
SDO Climate −0.04 −0.05 [−0.11, −0.01]
 GM food −0.02 −0.03 [−0.08, −0.00]
 Vaccination −0.06 −0.06 [−0.13, −0.01]
 Fluoridation −0.04 −0.05 [−0.11, −0.01]
 Evolution −0.04 −0.05 [−0.12, −0.01]
Notes. Standardised (β) and unstandardised (b) coefficients 
shown. Bootstrapped 95% confidence interval is for b (5,000 
samples). All effects are significant (bootstrapped confidence 
interval does not include zero). RWA = right-wing authori-
tarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.
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the survey were included in analyses. A total of  
9,126 New Zealand-based individuals completed 
the survey. Participants who failed either of  two 
attention checks (e.g., “Please select ‘agree’ for 
this statement”; Gummer et al., 2018) embedded 
in the survey were removed from the sample 
(1,025 participants).
The final sample displayed a relatively even 
split of  gender with 46.8% of  participants identi-
fying as women, 53.2% as men and 0.08% report-
ing non-binary or no gender (excluded from 
analyses). The median age bracket was 45–49 
years. In terms of  reported ethnicity, the sample 
was primarily European/Pākehā (91.5%), fol-
lowed by Māori (6.4%), Asian (1.8%) and Pacific 
Peoples (1.1%). A substantial number of  partici-
pants (7.1%) provided an “Other” response. 
Ethnicity response options were not mutually 
exclusive; 7.2% of  participants selected more 
than one option. Reported highest qualification 
was as follows: high school completion or lower, 
17.3%; partially completed bachelor’s degree/
trade certificate, 12.8%; completed bachelor’s 
degree/trade certificate, 42.2% (median and 
modal response); and postgraduate degree, 
27.7%. Demographically, the sample was older, 
more educated and skewed towards European 
ethnicity compared to the general New Zealand 
public (Statistics New Zealand, 2013).
Materials. Measures used in the survey were iden-
tical to those in Study 2 (scale αs are reported in 
Table S6 in the online supplemental material). 
The survey was undertaken in collaboration with 
other researchers and included a range of  other 
items unrelated to the current study.
Procedure. Participants were recruited through a 
collaboration with a large New Zealand weekend 
newspaper. This approach has proven successful 
in gathering relatively large and broadly repre-
sentative samples previously (e.g., Wilson et al., 
2014). Several news articles highlighting the sur-
vey were published in print and online, providing 
participants with a link to complete the survey on 
the Qualtrics platform. The survey was presented 
as a study of  New Zealanders’ opinions about 
scientific, health and environmental issues.
Participants who opted to take part in the 
study accessed the survey via a link provided in 
both print and online versions of  newspaper arti-
cles highlighting the survey. The link directed 
participants to the Qualtrics survey platform 
where they provided informed consent and com-
pleted the survey. Upon completion participants 
were offered the option to enter a prize draw to 
win an incentive prize (an Apple iPad Pro). The 
study was approved by the Victoria University of  
Wellington School of  Psychology Human Ethics 
Committee (application number: 0000025633). 
Data were cleaned, and descriptive and inferential 
statistics calculated in SPSS v23. A small number 
of  missing values (0.52%) were imputed using the 
Expectation-Maximization procedure in SPSS.
Results
As in Studies 1 and 2, as a first step we regressed 
rejection of  science variables onto age, gender, 
RWA and SDO. All regressions were significant, 
Fs(4, 8033) > 108.2, ps < .001. The results, 
shown in Table 3, largely mirror those of  Study 2: 
RWA is a significant predictor of  rejection 
Table 3. Demographic and ideological predictors of acceptance of science (NZ sample).
Climate change GM food Vaccination Fluoridation Evolution
Age −.07*** −.03** −.02* .07*** .01
Gender (M = 1) .08*** .17*** .06*** .13*** .09***
RWA −.33*** −.23*** −.14*** −.19*** −.43***
SDO −.29*** −.00 −.12*** −.09*** .04***
Adjusted R2 .30*** .09*** .05*** .08*** .18***
Notes. RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; SDO = social dominance orientation.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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of  science across all issues and SDO predicts 
rejection of  science regarding climate change, 
vaccination and fluoridation but not GM food. In 
contrast to Study 2, we also report a small but 
significant positive effect of  SDO on belief  in 
evolution.
We also fitted a structural equation model 
identical to that described in Study 2 (χ2(1278) = 
16454.37, CFI = .927, RMSEA = .038 [0.038, 
0.039], SRMR = .040). We found that both RWA 
and SDO have significant, negative indirect 
effects on beliefs about all five scientific issues 
mediated via perceived credibility of  scientists 
(Table 4), controlling for effects mediated by 
other variables. That is, both RWA and SDO neg-
atively predict perceived credibility of  scientists 
which in turn positively predicts agreement that: 
humans are causing climate change; GM food is 
safe for human consumption; vaccines are safe 
and effective; water fluoridation is safe and effec-
tive; and humans are descended from primate 
ancestors. Total effects of  RWA and SDO and 
indirect effects mediated by other variables are 
reported in the supplementary material, where we 
note several minor differences regarding the 
pattern of  substantive results reported in the US 
and NZ public samples.
Discussion
We report here, for the first time, that RWA pre-
dicts rejection of  the mainstream scientific con-
sensus on GM food, vaccination, evolution and 
fluoridation. Social dominance orientation also 
predicts rejection of  the scientific consensus on 
vaccination and, marginally, fluoridation. Previous 
research has noted the role of  ideological atti-
tudes RWA and SDO as predictors of  climate 
change denial (Stanley & Wilson, 2019), a finding 
we replicate across all three studies. In sum, indi-
viduals who are more authoritarian or more 
accepting of  inequality are less likely to align their 
views with scientific consensus on socially 
debated issues. Thus the current research adds to 
the growing literature examining the ideological 
antecedents of  rejection of  science (Hornsey & 
Fielding, 2017; Lewandowsky & Oberauer, 2016), 
situating these predictors within the larger theo-
retical framework of  the Dual Process Model 
(Duckitt & Sibley, 2009). Our results also extend 
previous research by examining beliefs about 
community water fluoridation and evolution, two 
issues which are subject to continued public 
debate (Barnes et al., 2017; Helmi et al., 2018) 
and, in the case of  water fluoridation, can have 
wide ranging impacts on public health (Armfield, 
2007; Moore et al., 2017).
In Studies 2 and 3 we used structural equation 
modelling to examine potential paths by which 
RWA and SDO might influence beliefs about 
specific scientific issues in US and New Zealand 
samples. Drawing on previous research examin-
ing rejection of  science, we identified several 
ideological and science-related variables associ-
ated with rejection of  science. These were incor-
porated as parallel mediators in a model with the 
aim of  disentangling the paths which lead to high 
RWA and SDO individuals rejecting science. Our 
model explained substantial variation (between 
28% and 55%) in beliefs about all five scientific 
issues examined and revealed the heterogeneity 
of  influences across scientific domains. Across 
Table 4. Indirect effects of ideological attitudes on 
scientific beliefs, mediated by perceived credibility of 
scientists (Study 3, NZ sample).
Predictor Outcome β b 95 CI
RWA Climate −0.10 −0.23 [−0.26, −0.20]
 GM food −0.08 −0.18 [−0.21, −0.15]
 Vaccination −0.13 −0.17 [−0.19, −0.15]
 Fluoridation −0.11 −0.22 [−0.26, −0.19]
 Evolution −0.08 −0.18 [−0.22, −0.15]
SDO Climate −0.04 −0.06 [−0.08, −0.05]
 GM food −0.04 −0.05 [−0.06, −0.03]
 Vaccination −0.06 −0.04 [−0.06, −0.03]
 Fluoridation −0.05 −0.06 [−0.08, −0.04]
 Evolution −0.03 −0.05 [−0.06, −0.04]
Notes. Standardised (β) and unstandardised (b) 
coefficients shown. Bootstrapped 95% confidence 
interval is for b (5,000 samples). All effects are 
significant (bootstrapped confidence interval does not 
include zero). RWA = right-wing authoritarianism; 
SDO = social dominance orientation.
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Studies 2 and 3 we did observe one important, 
and consistent, pattern: perceived credibility of  
scientists – predicted by both RWA and SDO – is 
significantly associated with rejection of  science 
in every domain examined.
In some cases there was no significant total 
effect of  SDO on rejection of  science (specifi-
cally GM food and evolution); however, exami-
nation of  indirect effects revealed some 
mediated effects had opposing signs, effectively 
cancelling each other out (an example of  incon-
sistent mediation; MacKinnon et al., 2007). For 
example, high (vs. low) SDO individuals per-
ceive scientists to be less credible, which in turn 
is associated with rejection of  evolution science. 
However, they also report lower religiosity, 
which predicts greater acceptance of  evolution 
science. Such findings highlight the value of  the 
structural equation modelling (SEM) approach 
in examining the relationship between ideologi-
cal attitudes and rejection of  science.
Our findings make a strong case for the role 
of  RWA and SDO in rejection of  science, with 
relatively consistent results across three very dif-
ferent samples. However, we must acknowledge 
several limitations. First, all three studies were 
cross-sectional in nature, limiting the causal infer-
ences that can be made regarding the relation-
ships between ideological attitudes and rejection 
of  science. Future experimental and longitudinal 
work is required to confirm the causal direction 
assumed in our models. Second, while our 
research used samples from two countries, both 
were developed Western nations. Thus, we must 
exercise caution in generalising the current results 
to different cultural and political contexts, a point 
we return to below. The combination of  predic-
tors for each rejection of  science issue offers rich 
insights for researchers focusing on beliefs and 
attitudes in each domain. However, due to space, 
we will focus our discussion here on the consist-
ent mediator identified across all issues in both 
models: perceived credibility of  scientists. We 
hypothesised that RWA and SDO would be 
linked with negative general perceptions of  sci-
ence and scientists as well rejection of  specific 
scientific conclusions. Our results show this to be 
the case. We theorised that this lack of  trust in 
science might arise from the perception that sci-
entists threaten hierarchical social structures and 
violate moral norms. This reasoning remains 
speculative. Further research is required to find 
out how individuals with higher levels of  RWA 
and SDO perceive the actions and intentions of  
scientists and how this in turn affects their per-
ceptions of  scientists’ credibility.
The finding that both RWA and SDO predict 
negative attitudes to scientists should also be 
considered in the context of  previous research 
applying the DPM to group prejudice. Duckitt 
and Sibley (2007) report that attitudes towards a 
range of  social groups appear to cluster into 
three distinct categories – dangerous, derogated 
and dissident – with prejudice towards these 
broad groups differentially predicted by RWA 
and SDO. High RWA (but not SDO) individuals 
show greater prejudice towards socially threaten-
ing, but not subordinate, dangerous groups such as 
terrorists or drug dealers. High SDO (but not 
RWA) individuals show greater prejudice towards 
derogated groups who are socially subordinate or 
compete for social status and resources, such as 
ethnic minorities, immigrants, and people with 
disabilities. Both high RWA and high SDO indi-
viduals show greater prejudice towards dissident 
groups “dissenting from, challenging, or oppos-
ing mainstream norms and values” (p. 120), such 
as feminists, protestors and “people who cause 
disagreement”. This three-factor model of  prej-
udice has been confirmed in subsequent research 
(Asbrock et al., 2009; Sibley et al., 2010). 
Examining prejudice towards scientists alongside 
other social groups could aid in understanding 
what drives the association between RWA, SDO 
and distrust of  scientists. The fact that both 
RWA and SDO predict negative attitudes 
towards scientists in the current research sug-
gests that scientists may sit in the dissident cate-
gory (alongside atheists, feminists, 
environmentalists, protestors, and “people who 
criticise”; Cantal et al., 2015). Such a conclusion 
fits well with claims that scientists (at least in an 
academic setting) are “subversive” or “the critic 
and conscience of  society” (Grace, 2010; 
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Sidanius et al., 1991). Future research should 
confirm the place of  scientists as a social group 
within the three-factor model of  prejudice (see 
Cantal et al., 2015, for an example focusing on 
politicians).
As noted earlier, we recognise that our find-
ings focus only on two Western, developed 
countries. It is possible that in countries where 
scientists are perceived as political authorities 
(e.g., representatives of  the state) or as members 
of  elite and hierarchical institutions (i.e., more so 
than in the US or New Zealand), RWA and SDO 
respectively may predict positive attitudes 
towards scientists and their claims. Given our 
study is the first to examine the association 
between ideological attitudes and perceptions of  
scientists, comparable data from other countries 
are lacking. However, there is some supporting 
evidence in the form of  international surveys of  
public perceptions of  science. Nisbet and Nisbet 
(2019) report that the relationship between defi-
ance of  authority (which could be assumed to 
negatively correlate with RWA) and negative per-
ceptions of  science is moderated by country-
level democratic development, such that 
authority-rejecting individuals in less democratic 
(vs. more democratic) countries hold more nega-
tive perceptions of  science. The authors suggest 
this arises from science being associated with 
government and societal control in more author-
itarian regimes. In such a scenario we might 
expect people who embrace authoritarian values 
to hold scientists in higher regard – in contrast to 
the results of  the current study.
The finding that perceived credibility of  scien-
tists is associated with rejection of  science (con-
trolling for ideological predictors) also has a 
bearing on discussions regarding the role of  ideo-
logically motivated reasoning. Druckman and 
McGrath (2019) note substantial “concept creep” 
regarding the term “motivated reasoning”, such 
that some researchers label any disagreement 
with scientific consensus (e.g., climate change 
denial) as the product of  directionally motivated 
reasoning (that is, reasoning in pursuit of  a given 
conclusion; see also Hennes et al., 2020; 
Washburn & Skitka, 2018). Our results offer 
some support to Druckman and McGrath’s sug-
gestion that rejection of  science may be attrib-
uted, in part, to distrust of  scientists, whereby 
accuracy-motivated individuals do not consider sci-
entists’ claims to be a valid source of  information 
in drawing conclusions about debated issues. As 
our research is cross-sectional we cannot make 
causal inferences in this regard and do note there 
is some evidence that ideologically motivated rea-
soning may lead individuals to discount the cred-
ibility of  scientists (Cook & Lewandowsky, 2016; 
Kahan et al., 2011). In such a situation, (ideologi-
cally motivated) rejection of  science leads to 
lower trust in scientists generally, rather than vice 
versa.3 We plan to investigate these causal paths 
in future longitudinal research.
Understanding how ideology and trust in sci-
entists influence people’s opinion on specific sci-
entific issues is critical to public engagement 
(National Academies of  Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine, 2016a). By drawing on more 
nuanced analyses of  the ideological predictors 
of  rejection of  science, science communicators 
can craft messages to be ideologically congenial 
to a given audience for a given issue and sidestep 
potential conflicts (Hornsey & Fielding, 2017). 
For example, organisations seeking to promote 
water fluoridation to a sceptical audience could 
account for the fact that less scientific knowl-
edge, greater inclination to conspiracy thinking, 
and a distrust of  scientists are all associated with 
fluoridation opposition. Efforts to engage such 
an audience might involve some basic descrip-
tion of  water fluoridation and evidence of  its 
efficacy (addressing lower science knowledge), 
presented by a trusted non-scientist source, such 
as a community leader. Engagement efforts 
could also incorporate some communication 
techniques aimed at overcoming suspicions of  a 
conspiracy, such as validating general conspiracy 
belief  while debunking fluoridation conspiracies 
(Bolsen & Druckman, 2018).
In sum, when considering the role of  factors 
such as politics, religion and conspiracy think-
ing, our results echo the findings of  Rutjens 
et al. (2017) who conclude that “. . . different 
forms of  science acceptance and rejection have 
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different ideological roots, although the case 
could be made that these are generally grounded in 
conservatism” (p. 396; emphasis in original). Here 
we believe the authors refer not to political con-
servatism specifically but a more general orien-
tation towards valuing tradition, stability and 
hierarchy. Our finding that ideological attitudes 
predict rejection of  science across issues validates 
Rutjens et al.’s second point. In this respect we 
argue that RWA and SDO represent this ground-
ing orientation, capturing deeper ideological 
attitudes regarding tradition, hierarchy and 
authority upon which ideologies (such as poli-
tics) may be predicated (Duckitt & Sibley, 2009; 
Wilson & Sibley, 2013).
As a final note, we remind the reader that 
RWA and SDO are stable, but not immutable atti-
tudes. Though empirical evidence is limited, 
RWA and SDO are theorised to increase in 
response to threatening and competitive environ-
ments (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Sibley & Duckitt, 
2013). Following from this we would expect that 
events such as terrorist attacks, wars and financial 
crises would have an indirect eventual impact on 
public opinion regarding science. Increases in 
RWA and SDO may drive a rise in political con-
servatism, religiosity and conspiracy thinking as 
well as undermining trust in scientists – all ulti-
mately leading to more disagreement over scien-
tific findings. There is a counterpoint to this: if  
people perceive the world as a less threatening 
and competitive place, society as whole may 
become more accepting of  scientific evidence.
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Notes
1. We use the term “rejection of  science” here 
to refer to what Lewandowsky, Oberauer and 
Gignac (2013) define as “the dismissal of  well-
established scientific results for reasons that are 
not scientifically grounded” (p. 623), consistent 
with recent psychological research (Hornsey & 
Fielding, 2017; Rutjens et al., 2017). Rejection/
acceptance of  science in this context is typically 
operationalised as disagreement or agreement 
or with statements that are supported by an 
established scientific consensus (or opposed in 
the case of  reverse items).
2. We must acknowledge the potential overlap 
between the conservatism and free-market scales 
– particularly the conservatism item referring to 
views on economic issues (correlated with the 
free-market scale in Studies 2 and 3: rUS = .49, 
rNZ = .38; but exhibiting higher corrected item-
total correlations with the conservativism scale: 
rUS = .79, rNZ = .66). A factor analysis (promax 
rotation) of  items from both scales indicated that 
the conservatism and free-market items loaded 
differentially onto separate factors (with a load-
ing cutoff  of  |.2|). We also repeated analyses 
with the “economic issues” item removed from 
the conservatism scale and found that this did 
not substantially alter results. For further discus-
sion of  the relationship between self-reported 
political ideology and free-market endorsement, 
see Azevedo et al. (2019). 
3. Following the suggestion of  a reviewer, we con-
structed and compared alternative versions of  the 
model reported here in which credibility of  sci-
entists is either a predictor of, or predicted by, the 
rejection of  science variables. While both models 
were plausible based on fit indices – hinting at a bi-
directional relationship – the former (credibility as 
predictor of  rejection of  science) proved a better fit 
to the data in both samples (see Figure S2 and Table 
S11 in the online supplemental material).
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